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Alicia Gutierrez

Project Operation Whitecoat:
Military Experimentation, Seventh-Day Adventism
and Conscientious Cooperation
BY ALICIA GUTIERREZ
From 1954-1973, the U.S. Army established an
unlikely alliance with the Seventh-Day Adventist (SDA) Church
and their unequivocal support for a series of biomedical
experiments called Project Operation Whitecoat (POW). In a letter
dated October 19, 1954, Dr. T. R. Flaiz, Secretary of the Medical
Department of the General Conference of SDAs wrote to thenSurgeon General Major George E. Armstrong, “the medical
research project which you have under way… offers an excellent
opportunity for these young men to render a service which will be
of value not only to military medicine but to public health
generally.”1 While the notion of church, military and government
cooperation, especially in regards to human experimentation may
seem incongruous, unorthodox and paradoxical, the nature of the
relationship that the church was able to maintain with the military
hierarchy allowed for a series of biological experiments that can
be considered a model of ethical human experimentation.
ABSTRACT:

According to testimony by the United States General Accounting
Office to the Legislation and National Security Subcommittee,
Committee on Government Operations in the House of
Representatives, a shroud of secrecy surrounds government
sponsored experiments conducted on humans between 1940 and
1974.2 Since the Nuremberg trials, which condemned the acts of
Nazi doctors, US agencies adopted the Nuremberg Code. The
Nuremberg Code requires that researchers obtain informed consent
1

T. R. Flaiz, M.D., “Letter to Major General George E. Armstrong,” October
19, 1954.
2
Human Experimentation: An Overview on Cold War Era Programs
(Washington, D.C.: United States General Accounting Office, September 28,
1994), 3.

59

Project Operation Whitecoat

before conducting any research involving human subjects.
Researchers are also required to allow their human subjects the
freedom to discontinue participation in any study in which they are
involved as human subjects. Despite these codes designed to
protect the rights of human subjects in research, in terms of
government and/or military medical experimentation after World
War II, no overarching or overseeing agency existed to ensure that
these experiments were being executed in accordance with federal
laws or policies, such as the Nuremberg Codes.3 Between 1954 and
1973, a series of ethical experimentation was conducted in the
United States that stood in sharp contrast to regulations that might
have better protected the humans involved in the research.
Project Operation Whitecoat (POW), as it was called, was a
code name for an alliance between the US Army and the SeventhDay Adventist (SDA) Church to provide an alternative means by
which Seventh-Day Adventists could serve their county militarily.
This alternative means of service meant that Seventh-Day
Adventists would become the subjects of military medical
research. In a letter dated October 19, 1954, Dr. T. R. Flaiz,
Secretary of the Medical Department of the General Conference of
SDAs wrote to then-Surgeon General Major George E. Armstrong,
“the medical research project which you have under way… offers
an excellent opportunity for these young men to render a service
which will be of value not only to military medicine but to public
health generally.”4 Attached to this letter was a preliminary
statement by the General Conference regarding the use of
volunteers for medical research. It stated, “it is the attitude of
Seventh-Day Adventists that any service rendered voluntarily by
whomsoever in the useful necessary research into the cause and
treatment of disabling disease is a legitimate and laudable
contribution to the success of our nation and to the health and
comfort of our fellow man.”5 POW gave Seventh-Day Adventists
a way to serve the country in a meaningful way that did not
involve fighting in a war directly.

3

United States General Accounting Office, Human Experimentation, 1.
Flaiz, 10.
5
Statement of Attitude Regarding Volunteering For Medical Research (The
General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists, October 19, 1954).
4
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Surprisingly little, if any, research has been done on POW.
Because of the direct involvement of the SDA church and the strict
supervision of the Army surgeon general, POW was able to
distinguish itself away from the shroud of secrecy surrounding
other military experiments and serve as a model for conscious,
ethical human experimentation in an era when deception ran
rampant.
The Seventh-Day Adventist Church in America: A Brief Military
History
Throughout its history, the SDA church has been actively engaged
and concerned with the involvement of its members in the military.
In order to better grasp the role that the SDA church was able to
play in POW, it is important to look at its history through the lens
of military relations. The SDA church emerged from the Christian
Connection and later, the Millerite Movement. The Christian
Connection was “a religious body that in the mid-nineteenth
century was fifth in membership within the United States.”6 One of
the founding beliefs in this movement was literal interpretation,
and sole authority, of the Bible. This included observance of the
seventh-day (Saturday) as the Sabbath and the belief in the “literal
soon advent of Christ.”7
Baptist preacher William Miller was renowned for the
knowledge that he displayed when interpreting the Bible. He
believed that Christ’s second coming was fast approaching which
prompted believers and scores of churches to adopt the name
‘Adventist’ for themselves by the 1830s and 1840s.8 Some
Adventists followed Miller’s belief that based on his calculations
the Second Advent would occur in 1844. There were others,
however, who believed that Christ’s advent could not be
determined, and was yet to arrive, causing a theological schism. In
1844, a small wood structure in Washington, New Hampshire
became the first ‘Adventist’ church, and on May 21, 1863, “the

6

“History of the Seventh Day Adventist Church,”
http://www.adventist.org/world_church/facts_and_figures/history/index.html.en
(accessed June 25, 2010).
7
“History of the Seventh Day Adventist Church.”
8
“History of the Seventh Day Adventist Church.”
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denomination was officially organized… [and] included some 125
churches and 3,500 members.”9
The early SDA church placed an important emphasis on
freedom. As the church itself points out, because of this, SDAs
“worked toward abolition of slavery as well as roles for women in
the church… Freedom was also emphasized through an orientation
toward temperance and health reform… Thus within nineteenthcentury Adventism one finds strong anti-slavery actions, women
licensed as ministers, and health reform principles that included
abolition of alcohol and tobacco.”10 This movement towards
freedom, especially anti-slavery sentiment, caused SDAs to side
with the North during the Civil War. According to a statement
released by renowned Adventist prophetess Ellen G. White in
1863, “God gives him [the slaveholder] no title to human souls,
and he has no right to hold them as his property... God has made
man a free moral agent, whether white or black. The institution of
slavery does away with this and permits man to exercise over his
fellow man a power, which God has never granted him.”11 Yet,
literal interpretation of the Bible, including the Sixth
Commandment that forbids killing, put them at odds with the
military. Because of the Civil War, the SDA church was forced to
deal with this ideological dilemma just as the church was being
formed.12 In 1863, the Union implemented conscription and the
SDA church took an official stance against military service. This
clearly resonates from White’s prophecy:
God’s people… cannot engage in this perplexing
war, for it is opposed to every principle of their
faith. In the army they cannot obey the truth and at
the same time obey the requirements of their
officers… Those who love God’s commandments
will conform to every good law of the land. But if
the requirements of the rulers are such as conflict
9

“History of the Seventh Day Adventist Church.”
“History of the Seventh Day Adventist Church.”
11
Ellen G. White, “The Rebellion,” in Testimonies for the Church, vol. 1, 4th
ed. (Mountain View: Pacific Press Publishing Association, 1948), 358.
12
Ronald Lawson, “Onward Christian Soldiers? Seventh-Day Adventists and
the Issue of Military Service,” Review of Religious Research 37, no. 3 (March
1996): 196-197.
10
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with the laws of God, the only question to be settled
is:
Shall we obey God, or man?13
The SDA position on war made them a minority, which resulted in
some disdain and contempt, yet they were not faced with legal
penalization. When a member of the SDA church was drafted, the
congregation utilized a provision allowing them to pay their way
out of military service. Thus, drafted men were able to avoid
military service by paying a $300 commutation fee. When a poor
member of the congregation was drafted, the church worked
together to raise money, thereby cementing a legacy of the SDA
church involving itself in individual members’ military affairs. In
1864, the military created a stipulation allowing people or religious
organizations to file for noncombatant status; however, the
Adventist church did not immediately seek to gain recognition
under it because they felt secure, confident and protected by the
general accessibility of the commutations fee. When the
commutation fee became subject to restricted use in July of 1864,
the SDA church sought to gain recognition as noncombatants and
ultimately received it from the state and federal levels of
government.
Along with the end of the Civil War went any further
discussion of SDA military service. Although SDAs admonished
the Spanish-American War of 1898 and encouraged pacifism, the
lack of conscription did not necessitate any further action. But
when World War I erupted and conscription once again became an
issue that members had to face directly, the SDA church developed
a new viewpoint on what it meant to be a noncombatant.
When the draft was implemented for World War I, the
SDA church took a major step in their stance on military service.
Avoiding the myth that church doctrine was fait accompli, the
SDA church changed their definition of noncombatant service.
According to sociologist Ronald Lawson, “instead of being
pacifists who refused to be involved in war, Adventists would now
respond to the draft but refrain from bearing arms. As unarmed
soldiers, they would not kill but do good.”14 This conversion did
13
14

White, 361-362.
Lawson, “Onward Christian Soldiers?,” 198.
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not come without debate. A week after the U.S. declared war,
Adventist leaders met and petitioned that Adventists “be required
to serve our country only in such capacity as will not violate our
conscientious obedience to the law of God.”15 Dr. Lawson
believes that this change was an attempt by the church to move
away from ‘sect’ towards ‘denomination.’ According to Lawson,
who utilizes Rodney Stark and William Sims Bainbridge’s churchsect theory:
A highly sectarian group has high tension with
society, a mainline denomination low tension, with
a continuum between the two representing varying
degrees of tension. As a group moves from sect
towards denomination, this is indicated by
relaxation in tension… When a religious group
concludes that military service contravenes its
principles and rejects the call to arms, that decision
marks it as different. Depending on the political
context, it may elicit antagonistic responses—scorn
and harassment from the public and punishment by
the state. This indicates that the group’s tension
with society is high— that it is towards the sect end
of the church-sect scale. Since many sects, over
time, reduce their tension with society and move
towards the church end of the scale, a sect holding a
deviant position on conscription is likely to modify
its stand in order to reduce tension.16
In other words, religious denomination and sect sit at opposite ends
of a sliding scale. ‘Sect’ or ‘denomination’ is determined by a
group’s tension with society. If a group’s religious doctrines or
practices place them in a position where they are at odds with
mainline society, they are considered a sect. Consequently, the
more a religious group’s doctrines and practices fit within mainline
society, the more they are considered a denomination. If a group
15

Douglas Morgan, “Adventist Review: Between Pacifism and Patriotism,"
http://www.adventistreview.org/2003-1535/story5.html (accessed June 25,
2010).
16
Lawson, “Onward Christian Soldiers?,” 193-194.
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does not want to retain the stigma associated with being considered
a ‘sect,’ then the best way to do this would be to reduce the
“tension” with society by adjusting their beliefs and practices to fit
mainline society.
The shift from non-militarized pacifists, who paid
commutation fees to avoid the draft, to militarized noncombatants,
who allowed themselves to be drafted, yet, classified differently
not to bear arms, did not seem to challenge SDA and biblical
doctrine. SDAs did not see a problem with aiding the sick. They
believed that whatever a wounded soldier decided to do after being
rehabilitated was not their responsibility. They were proud,
patriotic and willing to offer any assistance to their country so long
as it was harmonious with their religious conviction. Further, this
would create a legacy that combined patriotism with pacifism in a
way that was religiously based.17
Based on biblical principles, SDAs long believed that it
was important to give to God what is God’s and give to Caesar
what is Caesar’s.18 In other words, while SDAs believed that their
primary duty was to serve God, this adherence to God’s law and
the bible should not get in the way of their duties and
responsibilities here on earth (granted they do not conflict with
biblical principles). SDAs believed that it was imperative to follow
civil authority because it maintained order. Further, by being good
citizens and not stirring up agitation or confrontation, SDAs would
not be harassed for avoiding their duty to the country in a time of
war, and might even be regarded highly for doing their service.19
Good citizenship would allow the SDA to remain in good favor
with the government and allow the individual to continue to enjoy
the comfort and protection the government provides him (or her).
In order to prepare SDA men for noncombatant service, the
North American Division of the SDA church established training
schools at its colleges and academies in conjunction with the Red
Cross. This allowed young men who were predisposed to the draft
17

Morgan, “Adventist Review: Between Pacifism and Patriotism."
Based upon Matthew 22:21, in which several disciples asked Jesus if it was
right to pay taxes to Caesar to which he replied that Caesar should be given what
is his.
19
Francis McLellan Wilcox, Seventh-Day Adventists in Time of War
(Washington, D.C.: Review and Herald Publishing Association, 1936), 28.
18
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to acquire basic medical training so that they would be attractive
candidates for noncombatant medical units within the military.
This also worked well with the church because providing medical
aid would not conflict with allowable activity for the Sabbath.20
With the implementation of the draft, the SDA church took
steps to resolve potential conflicts between the service that their
noncombatant members would be asked to perform and other core
religious beliefs. The SDA church created the National Service
Organization (NSO), an organization that deals with conflicts that
arise in the armed forces between noncombatancy and Sabbath
observance.21 The creation of the NSO made it outwardly clear that
the SDA church would be readily available and vigilant in the
handling of its members within the armed forces.
In the wake of rising tensions in Europe prior to the start of
the second World War, the General Conference of SDAs released a
pamphlet in 1934 that, “urged youth to prepare for noncombatant
service by graduating in medicine, nursing, dietetics, or some other
medically related field, or to at least get experience as cooks,
nurses’ aides, etc.”22 The SDA church also implemented another
program, similar to their Red Cross training in WWI, but it was
revised and refined into a collaborative effort with the military and
army leaders who were used to supervise the program.23 Once the
war began, the program expanded among the SDA educational and
religious system. However, some SDAs disfavored the
involvement and relations between the government and SDA
church and accused it of being a “part of the national war
machine.”24 Referred to as ‘reformers,’ the SDA Reform
Movement began to diverge from mainline SDAs after WWI. The
movement began in Europe and expanded to the United States.
SDA Reformers believed that when the General Conference
adjusted their position of noncombatancy in the beginning of the
First World War, “the leadership… overthrew the commandments
of God… Hence, they have the right to exist as a separate
20

Lawson, “Onward Christian Soldiers?,” 198.
Lawson, "Onward Christian Soldiers?," 198
22
Ronald Lawson, “Church and State at Home and Abroad: The Evolution of
Seventh-Day Adventist Relations with Governments,” Journal of the American
Academy of Religion 64, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 290.
23
Lawson, “Church and State,” 290
24
Lawson, "Church and State," 291.
21
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movement… Reform Adventists believe that no true believer could
ever join the military, even in medical work.”25 For the most part,
however, SDA reformers were the minority, and mainline SDAs
supported noncombatant roles in military service.
With the passage of the Selective Service Act in September
1940, the SDA once again had to clarify its stand on SDA military
service versus other classifications such as conscientious objectors
or noncombatant military service:
Those refusing to bear arms were classified as
‘conscientious objectors’… During World War II,
American Adventists enthusiastically embraced the
national consensus about the rightness of defending
freedom against aggression of ultra-nationalist
dictatorships. Noncombatant military service…
offered a way to prove their patriotism. Moreover,
their distinguished service demonstrated that
noncombatancy was not cowardice. Desmond T.
Doss, with his bravery in winning the Congressional
Medal of Honor in 1945—the first ever awarded to
a noncombatant—provided compelling evidence for
that point.26
However, there was still lingering uncertainty as to whether or not
SDAs should bear arms. In Atlantic Union Gleaner, an SDA
newsletter for the Atlantic region, dated December 24, 1941, two
weeks after the attack at Pearl Harbor, an article entitled “Should
Our Men Drill with Rifles?” relayed this fear. This article stated
that “considerable… agitation has been stirred up among our
people regarding the question as to whether our young men in
army camps should consent to drill with rifles when pressure from
army officers is brought upon them…”27 In order to alleviate some
of the tension felt by men in the military, or planning to enter the
25

Gerhard Pfandl, “Information on the Seventh-day Adventist Reform
Movement,” Biblical Research Institute, July 2003.
http://www.adventistbiblicalresearch.org (accessed June 25, 2010).
26
Morgan, Adventist Review: "Between Pacifism and Patriotism.”
27
Carlyle B. Haynes, “Should Our Men Drill With Rifles?,” Atlantic Union
Gleaner, December 24, 1941.
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military, Atlantic Union Gleaner provided, in text, the Definition
of Noncombatant Training and Service as signed in Executive
Order on December 6, 1940. It also stated that the SDA
headquarters was “taking steps… to relieve this pressure at these…
camps by bringing to the attention of their post commanders the
official documents which have a bearing upon this particular
matter.”28 The article also listed the various different task groups
and assignments that were suitable for 1-A-O29 level COs.
Because of their dedication to serving both God and
country, many SDAs in military service refused the label of
‘conscientious objectors,’ and preferred, instead, the label of
conscientious cooperators. With this more cooperative position,
SDAs were more welcomed and received by the military hierarchy
than other religious groups.30 According to Lawson, “some 12,000
American Adventists served during World War II as
noncombatants in medical branches of the services, where they
could observe the Sabbath conscientiously, with official
government recognition.”31
When the Korean and Vietnam Wars commenced, the SDA
church revived their Medical Cadet Training Program as they
previously had operating during WWII. In Atlantic Union Gleaner,
an article on July 17, 1951 explains training at Camp Desmond T.
Doss. At the close of their training, one man stated “‘I do not fear
to enter the army service…I want to be faithful in my service to
my God and my country.’”32 In addition to the revamped training,
the Korean War also saw the first appointments of SDAs into
positions of military chaplaincy. This was clearly another step with
SDA/military relations. This is where the POW story begins.

28

Haynes, 3.
A status of 1-A-O signifies that the individual will participate in military
activity and will cooperate with military sanctions, but will only assume a
noncombatant role.
30
Lawson, "Church and State" 291.
31
Lawson, "Church and State" 291.
32
A.M. Ragsdale, “Camp Desmond T. Doss,” Atlantic Union Gleaner, July 17,
1951.
29
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Human Medical Experimentation: An Overview
Human experimentation has been in existence since the early
development of science, and it is beyond the scope of the paper to
deal with its extensive history. Nonetheless, it is useful to have a
brief understanding of the history of medical experimentation in
order to understand why POW was so different. The Ancient
Greeks and Romans engaged in occasional vivisection for
exploratory knowledge in medicine. Many experiments in early
civilizations were done on condemned criminals because their
suffering and death was seen as restitution for their crimes and as a
token for the greater good of society. In the Middle Ages, animals,
cadavers, and the occasional living human were used to learn about
the human body.33
During the Renaissance, an example of experimentation on
humans can be found in Fallopius, a physician who acquired
permission to perform experiments on criminals from the duke of
Tuscany. Throughout the Scientific Revolution, Paracelsus,
Andreas Vesalius and William Harvey began applying data
gleaned from the dissections of animals onto the study of humans.
This resulted in applications of the scientific method, and more
dangerous experiments being performed on humans.34
During the 19th and 20th centuries, human experimentation
increased along with newfound medical theories. Most of the time:
Research was done with treatments or cures in
mind; in others, treatments were denied or studies
ignored either because the disease in question was
limited to black populations or poor immigrant
groups, or so that researchers could follow the
progression of an untreated disease from beginning
to fatal end. The purpose in both instances was
simply to add to the body of knowledge, regardless

33

Andrew Goliszek, In the Name of Science: A History of Secret Programs,
Medical Research, and Human Experimentation (New York: St. Martin's Press,
2003), xii.
34
Adil E. Shamoo and David B. Resnik, Responsible Conduct of Research
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 182.
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of the consequences, or to answer questions
addressed by basic research.35
Because of this goal-oriented research, many basic human rights
were violated. For example, Adil Shamoo and David Resnik relate
how:
In 1895, Henry Heiman, a New York pediatrician,
infected two mentally retarded boys, 4 and 16 years
old, with gonorrhea. In 1897, the Italian researcher
Giuseppe Sanerilii injected yellow fever bacteria
into five subjects without their consent in order to
test its virulence… [and] the discoverer of the
bacillus strain that causes leprosy, Amauer Hansen,
carried out an appalling experiment on an unwitting
33-year-old woman when he twice pricked her eye
with a needle contaminated by nodules of a leprous
patient.36
Germ theory made experiments of the latter kind more common. In
1892, Albert Neisser, a professor of dermatology at the University
of Breslau, wanted to study the possibility of vaccinating healthy
children from the syphilis virus. To do so, he took samples from
syphilitics and inoculated three teenage prostitutes and four healthy
children without acquiring consent from them, their parents or
guardians. 37
The notion of consent in early medical experimentation was
novel and/or occasional at best. Because of social constructions,
racial theories and social Darwinism, certain people were not seen
as being as valuable as others, thereby resulting in scientists
performing some experiments without informed consent. This
meant that the people most often at risk were those belonging to
“vulnerable populations: children, mentally ill people, poor people,

35

Goliszek, xiii.
Shamoo and Resnik, 183, 185.
37
William H. Schneider, “History of IRB,” Indiana University-Purdue
University, Indianapolis, http://www.iupui.edu/~histwhs/G504.dir/irbhist.html
(accessed June 15, 2010).
36
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prisoners, minorities, and hopelessly ill people.”38 Vulnerable
populations are people whose capacity to provide consent is
inhibited or questionable. Also considered vulnerable populations
are: embryos, fetuses, and people who are coerced or pressured
into participating. Early to early-modern scientists and physicians
were in a situation where human ethical concerns were either
nonexistent, or juxtaposed to their desire and commitment to
critical advances in medicine, science and anatomy.
In Cuba between 1900 and 1901, Major Walter Reed and
his acting assistant surgeons wrestled with yellow fever. When
Jesse Lazear received orders from the Army Medical Corps, he
acquainted himself with Walter Reed and the two joined forces to
create a research team to study yellow fever where it originated.39
Their goal was to study the cause of yellow fever. Previous
research had led them to assume it was either mosquitoes or
fomites. The research team in Havana’s “aim was confirmation of
the mosquito theory and invalidation of the long-held belief in
fomites.”40 While they were able to prove their theories, another
important aspect that emerged from this experiment was the notion
of informed consent. Written in both English and Spanish, and
done “with the advice of the Commission and others, he [Reed]
drafted what is now one of the oldest series of extant informed
consent documents.”41 The informed consent forms required the
men to be over the age of 25, and allowed them the opportunity to
exercise their free will. They signed that they were volunteering to
participate in the experiment “and as a reward for participation
would receive $100 ‘in American gold,’ with an additional
hundred-dollar supplement for contracting yellow fever. These
payments could be assigned to a survivor, and the volunteer agreed
to forfeit any remuneration in cases of desertion.”42
While Reed and his team made efforts in the early 20th
century towards an ethical model for human experimentation,
38

Shamoo and Resnik, 184.
“The United States Army Yellow Fever Commission (1900-1901),”
University of Virginia Health Sciences Library Historical Collections,
http://yellowfever.lib.virginia.edu/reed/commission.html (accessed June 15,
2010).
40
“The United States Army Yellow Fever Commission.”
41
“The United States Army Yellow Fever Commission.”
42
“The United States Army Yellow Fever Commission.”
39
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some of the clearest and most recent examples of unethical human
research can be seen in Nazi and Japanese experimentation during
WWII. In the concentration camps, the prisoners were at the mercy
of their captors. Nazi medical doctors within the concentration
camps had an unfathomable degree of freedom in performing
experiments. Humans were treated like guinea pigs and subjected
to the experiments of their physicians’ choice which usually fell
into at least one of three categories: experiments for military
research purposes, experiments to prove racial superiority, or
experiments based on the interest of a particular scientist or
researcher. Among these (but not limited to these) were typhus
experiments, malaria experiments, high altitude experiments,
hypothermia experiments, seawater experiments (to determine
possibilities for making seawater potable), polygal (blood
coagulation) experiments, mustard gas experiments, and
sterilization experiments.
In China during WWII, the Japanese implemented their
very own system of medical and biomedical experimentation on
subjugated people and prisoners-of-war. Unit 731 was “the world’s
largest and most comprehensive biological warfare programme
[sic].”43 It was responsible for dropping “plague-infected fleas…
over Chinese cities, causing epidemics, [and pouring] cholera and
typhoid cultures… into wells. Prisoners were dissected alive
without anesthetics. Others were subjected to pressure changes that
made their bodies literally explode.”44 While there is evidence of a
American and Japanese cover-up, it is estimated that “more than
10,000 Chinese, Korean and Russian POWs were slaughtered in
these experimental facilities.”45 Even as some Nazi doctors were
condemned at the Nuremberg trials, all the Japanese doctors who
had been posted to Unit 731 “returned as pillars of the postwar
medical establishment, as deans of medical schools and heads of
pharmaceutical companies… [When asked about Unit 731 later,

43

“Unit 731: Japan's biological force,” BBC, February 1, 2002, Correspondent,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/correspondent/1796044.stm (accessed
June 15, 2010).
44
“The crimes of Unit 731,” New York Times, March 18, 1995, Late New York
edition, sec. 1.
45
“Unit 731” BBC February 1, 2002.
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they] complained of wasting the best years of their lives on
medical research that could not be continued after the war.”46
The lasting legacy of WWII and human medical
experimentation was the Nuremberg code. During the Nuremberg
Trials, one trial was devoted entirely to medicine. Sometimes
called the Doctors’ Trial, U.S.A. v. Karl Brandt et al transpired
between 1946 and 1947. During the trial, “twenty-three doctors
and administrators [were] accused of organizing and participating
in war crimes and crimes against humanity in the form of medical
experiments and medical procedures inflicted on prisoners and
civilians.”47 The doctors were “indicted on four counts: 1.
conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity; 2.
war crimes (i.e., crimes against persons protected by the laws of
war, such as prisoners of war); 3. crimes against humanity
(including persons not protected by the laws of war); and 4.
membership in a criminal organization (the SS).”48 The exact
crimes they were charged with included “twelve series of medical
experiments concerning the effects of and treatments for high
altitude conditions, freezing, malaria, poison gas, sulfanilamide,
bone, muscle, and nerve regeneration, bone transplantation,
saltwater consumption, epidemic jaundice, sterilization, typhus,
poisons, and incendiary bombs.”49 The experiments were
performed on concentration camp inmates and did not involve any
kind of informed consent. While in some cases, patients found
ways to be medical test subjects for the ‘perks’ it invoked (i.e. less
crowded living conditions, more food, not having to work), they
were subject to the will of the camp doctor and could be sent off
for experimentation as easily as they could be sent off for
dissection or the gas chambers.
Karl Brandt was the primary defendant because of his
position as the “senior medical official of the German government
46

Steven Butler, “A half-century of denial,” U.S. News & World Report, July
31, 1995.
47
“Medical Case Overview: Introduction to NMT Case 1, U.S. v. Karl Brandt et
al.,” Harvard Law School Library: Nuremberg Trials Project, A Digital
Document Collection,
http://nuremberg.law.harvard.edu/php/docs_swi.php?DI=1&text=medical
(accessed June 15, 2010).
48
“Medical Case Overview.”
49
“Medical Case Overview.”
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during World War II; other defendants included senior doctors and
administrators in the armed forces and SS.”50 The results of the
trials were staggering. Brandt and six others were sentenced to
death and executed, nine others were given lengthy prison terms,
while the rest were acquitted. Besides the executions and prison
terms, the Nuremberg code was established for appropriate codes
of conduct for ethical research using human beings.
Following WWII, human medical experimentation was
forced to revise itself according to the horrors that had been seen
via Nazi and Japanese medical experimentation. However,
research purposes shifted from germ theory to creating new
biochemical weaponry. Much of this shift in the United States can
be attributed to the newfound information acquired from giving
impunity to certain perpetrators of WWII, particularly Unit 731, in
exchange for research and data.
Despite the Nuremberg code, ethical abuses persisted for
quite some time. One of the reasons for this may be that “many
researchers here [in the U.S.] thought the Nuremberg Code applied
only to ‘barbarians’ and not to ‘civilized physician investigators’…
so human-subject research was not as strongly influenced by the
principles of the Nuremberg Code as it ought to have been.”51 A
striking example of this is the Tuskegee syphilis experiment.
Though it began in the 1930s, it continued well into the 1970s.
This study, which occurred in public health facilities in Tuskegee,
Alabama, was designed to study effects of later-stage syphilis on
African-American men.52 Funded by the U.S. Department of
health, six hundred men participated in this study. Those who
participated were not informed that they had syphilis or that they
were partaking in a medical experiment. Infected participants were
merely told “that they had ‘bad blood’ and could receive medical
treatment for their condition, which consisted of nothing more than
medical examinations. Subjects also received free hot lunches and
free burials.”53 Though a dependable treatment for syphilis was
50
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available in the 1940s, it was not administered to the test subjects
and the experiment continued despite the ethical concerns that this
raises.
In the 1950s, thalidomide, an approved drug in Europe, was
given to pregnant women because physicians believed it to help
with nausea and sleep deprivation. Unfortunately, it was soon
learned that exposure to thalidomide during the first trimester of
pregnancy could cause severe deformities in the fetus. Most the
women did not know that thalidomide was still an experimental
drug and did not give informed consent. Thalidomide caused many
of the babies to have shortened and/or missing limbs. It is
estimated that “some 12,000 babies were born with severe
deformities due to thalidomide.”54
From 1956-1980, “a team of infectious disease experts
from New York University working under a distinguished
researcher, Dr. Saul Krugman, had been doing hepatitis research at
the Willowbrook School on Staten Island, New York.”55
Willowbrook was a state-run facility for mentally handicapped
adolescents and children. In “trying to find a way to protect people
from hepatitis, Krugman and his colleagues deliberately infected
some of the children with the virus.”56 Though hepatitis isn’t
generally life threatening, it can cause permanent damage to the
liver. The conditions at Willowbrook made headlines in the 1960s;
“viral hepatitis was endemic… most children who entered
Willowbrook became infected within 6-12 months of admission.”57
Though Krugman and his team did acquire informed consent from
the parents of the children, critics of the experiment felt that the
parents were coerced into acceptance because they could not care
for their special-needs children on their own and were not fully
aware of the stipulations of the study.
In 1964, The Nuremberg code would be revisited in order
to create a new model for human medical experimentation. The
“World Medical Association met in Helsinki, Finland to… add… 2
novel elements [to the basis of the Nuremberg code]: the interests
54
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of the subject should always be placed above the interest of
society; [and] every subject should get the best known
treatment.”58 The Declaration of Helsinki, however, did not put an
immediate end to the unethical human experiments that were still
transpiring, or to future unethical medical experiments. In fact,
experiments seemed to increase at an alarming rate. For example,
continuing through the 1960s was the Jewish Chronic Disease
Hospital Study in which twenty-two elderly, severely ill, and
mostly demented patients with weak immune systems were
injected with live cancer cells in order to see the effects and spread
of cancer on those with compromised immune systems.59 Between
1963 and 1973, a million-dollar Atomic Energy Commission study
used prison inmates from Oregon and Washington and had their
testicles irradiated.60 The government used “approximately 6,700
human subjects… in experiments involving psychoactive
chemicals [like LSD]… Other agents were also used, including
morphine, Demerol, Seconal, mescaline, atropine, and
psilocybin.”61 Pregnant women and mentally handicapped children
were fed radioactive iron, and cereal, respectively; all without
informed consent or an awareness of their participation in the
studies.
Though many tests were under the individual supervision
of the directing scientists or physicians, the Department of Defense
(DOD) “and other national security agencies conducted or
sponsored extensive radiological, chemical, and biological research
programs.”62 Since these were largely for military intelligence, the
scientific and military communities cooperated together for more
than thirty years to attempt to stay ahead of the United States
military rivals.63 Because of their secretive nature, the exact
number of experiments and test participants remained hidden from
public knowledge.64 The secret nature of the programs and
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experiments has also made it difficult for test subjects to acquire
deserved medical care later in life. While the government does
offer compensation for its employees (military and civilian) who
have been injured on the job, the lack of information, risks, and
centralized information has caused difficulty for those who had
experiments performed on them from 1940-1974 and are
attempting to claim poor health as a result.65 The scope of tests
conducted under military or federal direction served to “support
weapon development programs, identify methods to protect the
health of military personnel against a variety of diseases and
combat conditions, and analyze U.S. defense vulnerabilities.”66
Project Operation Whitecoat
Project Operation Whitecoat was a project to identify and protect
civilians and the military from biological and chemical agents.
Since the use of these agents in earlier wars, the desire to
investigate these weapons and their effects became a military
priority.67 Project Operation Whitecoat originated from a smaller
test called CD-22. CD-22 was a coordinated effort between the
“Chemical and Medical elements of the Army and involved the
supervision of the Secretary of the Army, Army Chief of Staff, and
the Secretary of Defense.”68 In October of 1954, Lt. Colonel W.D.
Tigertt of the U.S. Army contacted Theodore R. Flaiz, M.D.,
Secretary of the Medical Department of the General Conference of
SDAs. In a memorandum from Tigertt to Major General George E.
Armstrong, MC, the Surgeon General of the Department of the
Army, Tigertt explains the letter he wrote to Flaiz. In the memo, he
states he contacted Dr. Theodore R. Flaiz, Secretary of the Medical
Department for the General Conference of Seventh-Day Adventists
as he wrote:
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To ascertain the views of his church organization as
they relate to the use of volunteers in medical
research…Dr. Flaiz proposed that it should be
considered by a small group of the Conference
Officers and agreed to bring such a group together
during the week of 18 October. Dr. Flaiz appeared
to be extremely interested and to consider that it
was a real opportunity for members of the SeventhDay Adventist group to assist in the national
defense. It is possible that the Church will actively
support the project and assist in obtaining the
necessary volunteers.69
Major General Armstrong, too, followed up with a letter to Dr.
Flaiz that expressed his hope that the General Conference of SDAs
would find the program acceptable and suitable for SDA
participation. Participation, Major General Armstrong stated,
would allow SDAs to “make yet another significant contribution to
our nation’s health and to our national security.”70
On October 19, 1954, Dr. Flaiz replied to Major General
Armstrong. In the letter, he stated that the General Conference
“appreciated very much Colonel Tigertt’s clear and patient
delineation of the plan for the medical research project… If any
one should recognise [sic] a debt of loyalty and service for the
many courtesies and considerations received from the Department
of Defense… Adventists, are in a position to feel a debt of
gratitude for these kind considerations.”71 He continued that the
General Conference felt that “the type of voluntary service which
is being offered to our boys in this research problem offers an
excellent opportunity for these young men to render a service
which will be of value not only to military medicine but to public
health generally… It should be regarded as a privilege to be
identified with this significant advanced step in clinical
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research.”72 The letter ends stating that the General Conference
would work on releasing a statement regarding the subject within a
few days. In the statement, it is expressed “it is the attitude of
Seventh-Day Adventists that any service rendered voluntarily by
whomsoever in the useful necessary research into the cause and the
treatment of disabling disease is a legitimate and laudable
contribution to the success of our nation and to the health and
comfort of our fellow men.”73
There are several reasons that might indicate why the
military sought out SDAs. One aspect, that many like to focus on,
is that SDAs were considered an ideal control group. With so many
church principles focusing on health and wellness, SDAs refrained
from drinking, smoking, most ate a vegetarian diet and most were
in general good health. According to “Colonel Dan Crozier, then
commander of USAMRIID [U.S. Army Medical Research Institute
for Infectious Diseases, previously USAMU, U.S. Army Medical
Unit]…‘because of high principles and temperate living, Adventist
men are more nearly uniform in physical fitness and mental
outlook.’”74
Another aspect is the commitment of the SDA church to
medical advancement. Over the course of its history, the SDA
church had established itself as a premiere health-serving
institution. Presently, “the SDA church organization owns and
operates a health care system that includes 168 hospitals, 433
clinics, and 130 nursing homes or retirement centers. SDA
educational institutions include 55 nursing schools… [with]
approximately 7300 nursing students currently enrolled…”75
According to a report by the National Service Organization of the
General Conference of SDAs, SDAs were recruited because the
“volunteers must be men in good health who are motivated to
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hazard some risk for a humanitarian cause.”76 Further, the fact that
most of the SDA men recruited for POW had similar backgrounds,
lifestyle, education and morals allowed for favorable research
conditions on a group requiring minimal disciplinary actions.
Another possibility is the relationships that had been
formed with SDAs and the military through the years of
established cooperative noncombatancy and Red Cross training
academies. Also, it is important to note “Adventist basic trainees
at Fort Sam Houston, Texas…[were] the largest single group of 1A-O soldiers.”77
SDAs may have also decided to embark on this project
because medicine was seen as a form of evangelism. According to
Francis McLellan Wilcox, former editor for the Review and
Herald, an SDA magazine, “this work [of evangelism] has been
carried forward in four great divisions, namely, evangelistic,
publishing, educational, and medical… all of these agencies should
be used for the accomplishment of one end,—the salvation of
souls.”78 Regardless, with the approval from the General
Conference, recruitment and testing began almost immediately. In
November of 1954, Lt. Col. Tigertt recruited twelve individuals
from Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, TX. On December 30, 1954,
the twelve recruits left Fort Sam Houston to Camp Detrick near
Frederick, Maryland and on January 14, 1955, the secretary of the
Army granted the authority to permit “research investigation
utilizing volunteers in defense against biological warfare.”79 In all,
Tigertt “indicated that approximately 80% of Seventh Day
Adventists who qualify and are approached by him do volunteer
for this particular assignment.”80
CD-22 was a series Q-fever tests. Q-fever is a “zoonotic
disease… [and is transmitted to] humans usually… by
inhalation.”81 Once an individual was designated for CD-22, and
later, Project Operation Whitecoat service, they were forbidden
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from receiving vaccines for typhus, yellow fever, cholera and the
plague while in basic training. For CD-22, volunteers from Camp
Detrick were flown to Fort Dugway, Utah and were exposed to Qfever via wind measures. Others remained at Camp Detrick and
were exposed via aerosol measures in the notorious eight ball
sphere, used for containment and disbursement of airborne
pathogens and directed to the inhaler.
In the experiments, the volunteers were “ordered onto
wooden platforms at various levels. When the atmospheric
conditions were right… medical officers conducting the tests put
on their gas masks and radioed to overhead aircraft to commence
dispersing the infectious agent onto the test sight.”82 The purpose
of the experiment was to acquire “dose-response data on… Q-fever
in humans.”83 After being exposed to the infecting bacteria,
Coxiella burnetii, the men returned to Fort Detrick for
“monitoring and observation.”84 Exposure to C. burnetii can cause
fever, nausea, vomiting, chest pain, chills, sweat, weakness, and
malaise. When the men returned to Fort Detrick, they “were left to
develop fever for three days before antibiotic therapy was
initiated.”85 Q-fever investigations were “terminated… in 1956
after yielding the first scientific data of its kind, gathered by U.S.
military investigations from experiments conducted on human
volunteer subjects.”86 Tigertt and Beneson (another doctor
involved in the experiments) published the results of the Q-fever
tests in Transactions of the Association of American Physicians in
1956.
When tests for CD-22 were terminated, a new phase of
tests was to begin but with a much broader scope. Project
Operation Whitecoat was designed to test:
The vulnerability of man to biological agents;
prevention and treatment of BW (biowarfare)
casualties; and identification of biological agents.
82
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Information such as the minimum infectious
dosage, effectiveness of prophylactic and
therapeutic measures, serologic responses to
infection and the effects of various doses of
inoculum, eventually provided answers to most
initial questions contained within the research
objectives.87
Again, Camp Detrick would serve as the experimental test center.
Camp Detrick came into existence in the early 1940s and was
intended to serve as a large-scale, militarized research facility. The
location was ideal because of it’s close proximity to Washington
DC and the Edgewood Arsenal, a chemical warfare research
center.88 Camp Detrick, officially named in April 1943, was the
center for early military research of “vaccines, toxoids, antibiotics,
disinfectants, and antiseptics… all the while developing techniques
for detecting, sampling, and identifying many pathogens and their
toxic products. Simultaneously, sterilization procedures and
decontamination protocols required development and
improvement.”89 The termination of CD-22 and the beginning of
Project Operation Whitecoat coincided with the changing of name
from Camp Detrick to Fort Detrick, making it a permanent
facility.90
Project Operation Whitecoat was no secret to the SDA
community. In an October 17, 1966 issue of the North Pacific
Union Gleaner, an article was devoted entirely to POW. POW was
described as a study “aimed at developing protective measures
against disease-producing organisms which might be disseminated
by an enemy in the event biological warfare is ever used against
this country.”91 Even youth Bible lessons discussed POW. On
October 8 and 15, 1963, a two-part lesson plan was given on POW.
POW, “after eight… years of continuous work… is still going…
The project simply involves medical experimentation. But as a
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result of this activity the Army Medical Service has made material
advances in the development of suitable methods of prevention and
treatment of infectious diseases… Thus all citizens benefit from
the program, not only members of the armed forces.”92 It describes
the experience of Tom Kopko, a young GI, and his first
experiences as a POW volunteer. The article follows him from his
plane ride from Fort Detrick to his testing area. It describes a wind
experiment similar to the aforementioned CD-22 experiment.
When the conditions for the experiment were right, the experiment
commenced. After the experiment, the men were taken back to
their test center and “‘were told to remove our clothing as quickly
as possible. A warm shower came next… we then went through an
ultra-violet-light area and found ourselves in a room where our
regular Army clothes were waiting for us.’”93 The duration of the
individual test was short. When the men returned to Fort Detrick,
they were placed in isolation where they were monitored
throughout the day for several weeks or months, depending on the
individual.
Throughout the duration of POW, the volunteers “were
involved in 153 research projects to determine the safety of
vaccines and antibiotics and prevention and treatment of… Q
Fever, Tularemia, Sandfly Fever, Typhus Fever, Typhoid Fever,
Rift Valley Fever, Rocky Mountain Spotted Fever, Yellow Fever,
Plague, and Eastern, Western and Venezuelan Equine
Encephalitis.”94 Other tests and experiments sought to test the
effectiveness of protective materials such as masks and suits,
others endured hypothermia and sleep deprivation tests and other
tests sought to develop appropriate “decontamination processes…
[for use] in the space program, in hospitals, biological outbreaks
(e.g., present bioterrorism) and for the protection of research
workers.”95
The SDA church’s participation in POW did not go without
consequence or insult. In University Scope, the newspaper for
Loma Linda University, an article entitled “GC panel denies aid
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charge to biological warfare test” explains one of the more
prominent accusations against the church for its participation in
POW. During the turbulent social unrest of the 1960s and 1970s,
links between church and government brought heated debates and
accusations, one of which charged SDAs with helping the
government create biological weapons. In light of these attacks:
A committee of the General Conference of Seventhday Adventists, under the chairmanship of Neal C.
Wilson, vice-president of the North American
division, was appointed to investigate the project.
On September 11, Mr. Wilson and six other
members of the committee, including two
physicians, visited Fort Detrick and the
commanding officer of Project Whitecoat, Colonel
Daniel Crozier, U.S. Army.96
The committee visited Fort Detrick, acquired material evidence
and was to issue a report of its findings to Adventist colleges and
universities. Dr. Winton Beaven, one of the physicians on the
committee, was responsible for reporting the findings. When:
Speaking for the committee [he said], ‘…the project
has no relationship to…chemical or biological
warfare, either directly or indirectly… the Army
directive which established Project Whitecoat
clearly reads that it is related to defensive aspects in
developing… biological protective measures,
diagnostic procedures, and therapeutic methods…
None of the work in this project is used to improve
bacteriological weapons of the United States.’97
He stated that POW was not classified. He also stated that
professionals, both within and outside of the armed forces,
performed the tests that were based on sound research, and these
same professionals conducted the monitoring after the
96
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experiments. According to the article, Dr. Beaven explained,
criticism was being directed towards POW because its experiments
were being performed in the building adjacent to the one housing
the top-secret experimentation. According to Beaven, POW was
freely accessible and not top-secret.98 According to Clark Smith,
director of the NSO, “less than one percent of the Whitecoat work
is classified… the only reason so much remains unpublished is that
it is not complete.”99 As experiments were completed, many were
published in highly reputable journals. For example, in 1966, the
American Society for Microbiology published a POW study for
peer review. At the end of the article entitled “Antibiotic
Prophylaxis and Therapy of Airborne Tularemia,” the scientists
specifically stated “these studies were supervised by the
commission on Epidemiological Survey of the Armed Forces
Epidemiological Board. The cooperation of the War Service
Commission of the Seventh Day Adventist Church… [is]
gratefully acknowledged.”100
The church was greatly involved in the operations of POW.
When Tigertt went to Fort Sam Houston to recruit more SDAs to
POW, Elder Clark Smith of the NSO went with him to assure the
men that, while their service to this project was voluntary and up to
their own personal discretion, the church approved it as a form of
noncombatant service. When a man wanted to participate in POW,
he was interviewed to examine psychological health and was
requested to fill out a questionnaire provided by Elder Smith. An
SDA chaplain was allowed to be present during briefings and
interviews. The local SDA chaplain was provided with a finalized
list of POW participants “…for posting on [the] church bulletin
board.”101 Elder Smith was also allowed to answer questions
should they arise, and the local SDA chaplain helped arrange
housing for married recruits.
In an early U.S. Army Medical Research and Development
Command meeting regarding POW, Col. Tigertt knew right away
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that it was essential to maintain amicable terms between
USAMRIID and the SDA church. In the minutes of that meeting it
states “this relationship was essential to continue work at his
laboratory…”102 Tigertt felt that failing to keep up on their part of
the bargain would be a blow to the relations between the
government and the cooperation with the SDA church. Further, in
order to maintain these good relations, Col. Tigertt recommended
that those POW men who wished to stay on assignment after their
experiment be allowed to do so in order to gain medical
experience. According to Tigertt, “…these personnel are good
men, educated and in a number of cases will continue their
education in medicine… If it were the policy that personnel who…
participate in Operation Whitecoat would be denied the additional
specialized training… a large number of those personnel who had
ordinarily applied… would no longer apply.”103 By maintaining a
mutually beneficial relationship, USAMRIID would get the
volunteers it needed to conduct its research, the SDA church would
maintain its right to noncombatancy, and volunteers would be
allowed experience with medical research.
The church was even involved at the local level. Frederick
SDA Church, being the closest SDA church to Fort Detrick,
provided these men with a church community away from home.
Even though medical aid was seen as an acceptable form of ‘work’
on the Sabbath, POW volunteers got Saturdays off. Frederick SDA
church members Dr. Frank Damazo and his wife took it upon
themselves to take care of these fellow SDAs for the duration of
their stay, and the duration of the project itself. Very quickly, the
entire “…congregation provided interest, care, and support for all
Whitecoat members… This church gave special help to those men
and families nearby during the entire time the program was in
operation.”104 Frequently, potlucks and fellowships would be held
at church members’ homes so that the POW volunteers and church
members could have the opportunity to become acquainted on an
individual basis.
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Guarded Secret or Misunderstanding?
Because of the openness of the experiments and the ability for the
men involved to associate with other volunteers and people outside
of the experiment, there was no element of secrecy in POW. With
the wide variety of primary sources (both religious and secular)
offering articles and experimental research findings, it is seemingly
incomprehensible to conclude that POW was a secret government
experiment to create biological offensive weapons.
It was in the church’s best interest to maintain contact with
military personnel to ensure that their support of a particular
program was not given under false pretenses or inaccurate
information. It was also in the best interest of military personnel to
ensure that POW was performed with the utmost ethical standards.
The informed consent forms for volunteers were very explicit and
clear. The volunteer had written permission to “revoke… consent,
and withdraw from the study without prejudice.”105
Another clear indication of a difference between POW and
other military medical experiments is the bond and community that
POW test subjects still have today. POW volunteers have engaged
in reunions for approximately two and a half decades. Reunions
are typically alternated between east and west coast, with most east
coast reunions at Frederick SDA church. POW volunteers are not
anonymous; they have names, files, informed consent forms,
photographs, reunions, and mailing lists. If the military attempted a
secretive biological offensive warfare program with POW, then
they failed to do so. This is quite evident in the amount of
correspondence and literature that was out at the time: the church
leadership and the church members knew about it.
POW was created with the intent to serve as a defensive
measure against biological warfare. Whether or not information
acquired from POW was used as a measure of offensive biological
warfare is a matter of debate, but with all advancements in science,
information can be used as easily for both good and evil. Radiation
can be harmful, but when used effectively can cure cancer.
Surgical advancements in reproductive health can allow a couple
that no longer wishes to conceive to sterilize themselves, but
105
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people were forcibly sterilized in the early 20th century around the
globe for being genetically inferior. POW is no different from
these aforementioned examples. If the knowledge is there to help
someone, then the information can just as easily be construed to
harm someone. The dialectic of medical theory applies no more to
POW than it does to studies of other medical conditions.
POW was disbanded in 1973. Some sources indicate this
date because it was the year the draft ended. Others, however, cite
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972 and the
resulting treaty calling for the end of all biological weapon
production, development and stockpiling as another possible
reason for the formal end of this program. However, if the latter of
the two options is correct in determining why POW ended, this is
disconcerting to those who believe POW to be directed for the
purpose of defensive measures. For according to the treaty, all
signatories must destroy or “divert to peaceful purposes” all
biological agents, toxins, weapons, etc.106 If POW were purely
defensive or peaceful, said treaty obligations would not have
applied to it. Further, no documentary evidence linking the two
events has been found. However, the end of the draft may also
have caused a disbanding in POW, as the end of conscription
would limit the influx of 1-A-Os, thereby depleting their exclusive
test group and necessitating a new, more open biological test
program, making it a much more viable reason for termination.
Conclusion
Presently, the SDA church’s position on the military has shifted
dramatically. While it still does not encourage its members to
actively enlist in the military, it recognizes free, individual choice.
Ideally, it would have its members serve in noncombatant roles,
but it does not castigate those who choose combatant roles; “while
the church ministers to noncombatant members in the army, as
well as to pacifists and combatants, it recognizes that individuals
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make free choices…”107 As a result, the SDA church is still
actively involved in its members’ military affairs. According to an
article in the SDA Biblical Research Institute website, theologian
Angel Rodriguez states, “when service in the military may result in
an open conflict with religious convictions… we [the church] must
be willing to enter into dialogue with government officials in an
effort to obtain for our members the right to practice their religious
convictions while in the military.”108
While some may question the church’s involvement in
government and/or military affairs, one thing remains certain: were
it not for the SDA church’s active involvement in Project
Operation Whitecoat, it is feasible that the many men who
volunteered could have become unidentifiable statistics and
numbers, without names, faces or voluntary consent forms, subject
to medical health uncertainties—anonymous, and only
remembered or represented as figures at a congressional hearing
for restitution and identification of former military medical
experiment test subjects. The SDA church played an important and
integral role in ensuring the ethical standards prescribed by the
Nuremburg Code and the Helsinki Declaration were followed in
the dealings with its members as test subjects in POW. Further
research is necessary to determine the full extent of church
involvement and to gain a clearer understanding of why POW was
disbanded. Doing so could prove that some U.S. government and
military experimentations were not buried under a dark shroud of
mystery and deception.
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